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Against those who argue that Hegel despaired of providing a solution to the
problem of poverty, I argue, on the basis of key dialectical transitions in Hegel's
Rechtsphilosophie, that he held at least the following: (1) that the chronic
poverty endemic to industrial capitalism can be overcome only through changes
that must include a transformation in practices of consumption, (2) that this
transformation must lead to more sittlich and self-conscious practices of
consumption, and (3) that the institution best-suited to enable the development of
these more sittlich and self-conscious practices of consumption is the
Korporation.
Hegel clearly struggled with his views on poverty. His brilliant analyses of pauperization
in industrial England and his heart-felt concern for its victims, especially in his lectures on the
Philosophy of Right,i stand in stark contrast to his near silence regarding a solution to the
problem of poverty. Unlike, for example, the category of crime, poverty is not presented as a
necessary evil that is aufgehoben as part of realization of a rational social order. According to
Shlomo Avineri's now classic assessment, "...on the problem of poverty, [Hegel] ultimately has
nothing more to say than that it is one of the 'the most disturbing problems which agitate modern
society'. On no other occasion does Hegel leave a problem at that."ii
The lack of an explicit solution to poverty in Hegel’s social philosophy has evoked
widely varying responses. Some have followedAvineri in viewing this as evidence of Hegel's
ability to recognize the unavoidable difficulties for welfare state capitalism.iii Others have seen it
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as highlighting the exclusionary character of his social philosophy.iv In contrast, I shall be
arguing that there is a very interesting approach to fighting poverty implicit in Hegel's social
philosophy and suggested by many of his explicit claims.
I shall argue that Hegel held the following view: (1) that the chronic poverty endemic to
industrial capitalism can be overcome only through changes that must include a transformation in
practices of consumption, (2) that this transformation must lead to more sittlich [ethical] and self-
conscious practices of consumption, and (3) that the institution best-suited to enable the
development of these more sittlich and self-conscious practices of consumption is the
associational institution that Hegel called the Korporation. I am not claiming that Hegel
believed that this transformation of consumer practices could actually be brought about. He
certainly made no proposal for doing so. My more limited claim is that the best way to make
sense of his writings on poverty is by attributing to him the view that such a transformation was
necessary for ending poverty.
To understand the case for this interpretation, it is important to focus on the systematic
structure of Hegel's economic and social philosophy. Accordingly, I shall focus on two key
dialectical transitions in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. The first is the transition in the notion of
"resources" (or "Vermögen") from the economic system based on the "family principle" to that
based on the principle of civil society. The second transition is the moment at which civil
society's attempts to solve the problem of poverty through colonization, international trade,
welfare policies, and industrial regulation reach a point of exhaustion in a moment of "bad
infinity." Hegel's account of these transitions provides crucial support for attributing to him the
view that ending poverty requires a "return of the ethical [das Sittliche]" into civil society and,
especially, into practices of consumption.
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1. MODERN POVERTYAND THE RELATIONALCHARACTER OF "RESOURCES"
In discussing Hegel’s view of poverty, it is perhaps best to begin with his rather cryptic
summation of the problem of modern poverty:
[D]espite an excess of wealth, civil society is not wealthy enough -- i.e., its own
distinct resources [ihr eigentümlichen Vermögen] are not sufficient -- to prevent an
excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble. [§245]
This formulation highlights what Hegel sees as the paradox of modern poverty: destitution in the
midst of unprecedented wealth. In trying to understand Hegel’s position – and his puzzling
contrast between “wealth” and “resources” – one should begin by noting that Hegel traces the
form and causes of modern poverty (that is, very roughly, poverty under conditions of capitalism)
to the fact that, in civil society, one must earn one's livelihood by producing for the ever-
changing needs of others. If one cannot find buyers in the marketplace -- or if one's employer
cannot -- then one will not be able to satisfy one's own needs. As a result of this
interdependence, civil society is a domain of profound and universal vulnerability for
individuals.
This is in sharp contrast to the economic order out of which civil society emerges, that
based on the "family principle." Hegel uses the concept of "family" to designate a form of social
relation characterized by immediate, relatively undifferentiated solidarity, particularly economies
based on agriculture. There, one consumes what one produces and produces what one needs. In
the economic order based on the family principle, one is naturally still vulnerable, but primarily
to the vicissitudes of the weather and the soil. The basic productive unit – say, the extended
family -- is not dependent on others’ desires for its produce.v In the familial economic order,
what is needed for livelihood – the "family resources" – is something "permanent and secure",
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typically, "soil" [§170; cf. §203, 247]. Once this is in place, families can provide for their simple
needs.
The concept of civil society entails something wholly different. For although a member
of civil society is in many ways freer and more independent [selbständig], "he cannot accomplish
the full extent of his ends without reference to others" (§182A)vi. In part, this has to do with the
industrial mode of production, with the way in which the division of labor puts individuals in a
fragile network of interdependence [§198]. But the more fundamental shift is systemic, and has
to do with change in the "Vermögen" that is required for a family to provide for itself:
For the families in civil society, property takes on forms other than land, for the
needs belonging to civil society become the resources out of which the family
creates its satisfied needs. [VPR III: 540]
Since members of civil society no longer produce for their own consumption, they cannot
provide directly for their own needs. They have to rely on others to produce the means for the
satisfaction of their needs, which they can only obtain if they have something to offer that others
need.
As the basis for earning a livelihood, the successful mediation of needs and labor
constitutes what Hegel terms the "resources" [Vermögen] distinctive of civil society.vii Hegel
distinguishes further between the "particular" resources of an individual (or family) within a
society and the "general" resources of the society as a whole. An individual's resources are a
function of being appropriately situated within the network of production and consumption, of
plugging into this network, of integrating oneself into the interdependent web of supply and
demand in such a way that the products of one's labor end up meeting the needs of others. From
this perspective, it becomes clear that Hegel's definition of the resources of individuals as "the
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possibility of sharing in the general resources" [§200] is not to be read in terms of getting one's
slice of the economic pie, for that would deny the relational element of Vermögen.viii Rather, the
resources of individuals are constituted by the degree to which they have the opportunity to
participate in a well-functioning economy.
Accordingly, the general resources [das allgemeine Vermögen] represent the capacity of a
society to provide individuals with the opportunity to earn a living, which depends on the
coordination of a fragile network of interdependencies, the "all-round mutual effects of everyone
on one another" [VPR IV: 594]. In the Encyclopedia, Hegel speaks of Vermögen as a societal
constellation, stating that "this mediation of satistisfaction by the labor of all constitutes the
general resources"[Werke 8: §524]. For my purposes, it is important to emphasize that these
interconnections comprising societal resources also depend on patterns of consumption: "The
endless multiplication of the needs of others is a lasting general resource for everyone."[VPR I:
313]. And more strongly and more optimistically: "No one can take a bite of bread without
thereby providing bread for others." [VPR III: 614]. In this relational sense, the needs of others
(and, more concretely, their consumer practices) are a resource for all. The point I wish to stress
here is that Hegel saw very clearly that the ability of civil society to provide individuals with the
opportunity to earn a livelihood depends on the patterns of consumption as much as on the
patterns of production. The Vermögen of a society is adequate just in case production and
consumption fit into a coherent pattern.
It is in light of this idea that we can make sense of §245, quoted earlier: what is needed in
order to avoid mass and chronic unemployment is not wealth as such but rather the dynamic
balance of production and consumption that Hegel terms “the resources [Vermögen] distinctive to
civil society”. Thus, the problem of poverty – or, more precisely, the emergence in wealthy
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countries of masses of able-bodied people who are unable to provide for themselves and their
families – is a problem of coordination. Rather than being generated by shortages or disasters –
as is the case in premodern economies – the form of poverty with which Hegel is concerned
results from the normal functioning of an "unrestricted" [§243] free market economy.
2. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATIONAND VULNERABILITY TO THE CONTINGENT
Of course, there is an additional step in Hegel’s argument, which has not yet been
mentioned, namely, that in order to achieve a high level of general resources, a society must
introduce economic liberalization and allow more room for subjective freedom -- precisely the
developments that generate the economic instability that causes modern poverty. Increased
subjective freedom and increased individual vulnerability are linked within civil society, in that
the primary causes of modern poverty are chronic overproduction and severe imbalances of
consumption and production – all of which can be linked to the fact that civil society is the realm
of contingency and arbitrariness [Zufälligkeit]. As a result of the liberalization and
industrialization of economic relations, there is no longer any guarantee that either the individual
producer will be able to participate adequately in the economy or that the overall balance of
consumption and production will provide enough jobs.
This raises the thorny issue of the status of subjective freedom within Hegel’s economic
philosophy. Although much has been made of his commitment to economic liberalization as
creating a realm of subjective freedom and individuality,ix Hegel has serious misgivings, as we
shall see, about giving subjective freedom free reign, even in the economic domain. Indeed,
everything in the systematic logic of the Philosophy of Right points toward an eventual
Aufhebung of the contingency on which subjective freedom is based.x And what drives civil
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society to this supersession of contingency is the travesty of poverty.
Because of their dependence on markets, it is a matter of luck [Zufälligkeit] whether even
hard-working individuals can earn a living in civil society. But it is at the collective level that
arbitrariness generates the most problems, in terms of the vicissitude of the market. For it is
here, in the delicate web of interdependencies that arbitrariness and contingency generate the
mass unemployment and poverty that concerns Hegel.
The contingency of the satisfaction [of needs] is present in the most diverse
manner in the mechanics of society’s necessity, both with regard to the
changeability of the needs themselves and as a result of...the errors and illusions
that can be introduced into individual parts of the whole mechanism and can bring
it into disarray. [Werke 8: §533]
Here contingency of consumer demand becomes relevant in its effect on the smooth operation of
the economy. Free trade policies leave the coordination of supply and demand to market forces.
In principle, Hegel favored loosening contemporary restrictions on trade and employment
practices, but he argues that the contingencies of production and consumption generate economic
disequilibria in civil society, leading to the collapse of firms and the loss of jobs. “When a
branch of industry does especially well, many individuals enter it. But the need for products has
its limits, and even if such an industry becomes overfilled, the individuals cannot see it; they
join in and are ruined” [VPR III: 698].
What Hegel is describing here is the blindness and haphazardness of boom-and-bust market
cycles.
As Hegel was well aware, laissez-faire economics treats the painful consequences of
disequilibria as the market's way of correcting itself. Despite his appreciation for the analytic
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power of this economic perspective [§189A; VPR IV: 487], Hegel has nothing but sarcastic scorn
for the way in which laissez-faire talk of "market self-correction", as his analogy with the plague
makes clear: "The plague ends too; it rights itself. But hundreds of thousands have perished of
it; they’re all dead. Everything has thereby also been straightened out again." [VPR IV: 625].
These market shifts occur so quickly that workers have little time to adapt, especially as a result
of the specialization of their training, and they are thrown out of work and lose their livelihood.
Hegel also saw causes of unemployment and poverty in long-term trends toward mechanization,
heavily capitalized competition, and general market-saturation, but it is the periods of
disequilibrium that are, rightly, his focus.
Whatever the causes, the resulting poverty generates a prima facie demand for serious
change. This is true for impoverishing inadequacies at both the individual and the collective
level, but I shall be focussing here on the collective level of the economy as a whole. At the
individual level of the "besonderes Vermögen," Hegel seems to favor a familiar welfare package
including public provision of minimal needs, assistance in locating work, and job training and
education, especially as these are provided through the Korporation.xi Hegel see the only
genuine anti-poverty approach as one of ensuring that the economy provides jobs that pay a
living wage, which is the task of ensuring that the collective Vermögen is adequate.xii
There is, then, a need for intervention in the economy, according to Hegel. Put in
systematic terms, the dialectic generated by poverty in civil society leads away from the
blindness and Zufälligkeit of unregulated market relations:
[T]he more blindly [the particular interest] immerses itself in its selfish ends, the
more it requires such regulation to bring it back to the universal, and to shorten
and moderate both the dangerous convulsions and the length of the intervening
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period during which these collisions are supposed to return, by a process of
unconscious necessity, to equilibrium. [§236R; translation revised].
The problem, then is contingency – blind chance. Within the individualistic framework of civil
society, economic actors lack the necessary awareness of the interdependencies within which
they are entwined [§236]. The need, in essence, is for what Hegel calls “self-consciousness”.
And in the process of achieving greater self-consciousness, the emergence of the public authority
[Polizei] plays an important transitional role, for it is only at that point that the economy can be
surveyed [VPR IV: 591, 600].
3. THE FAILURES OFTHE PUBLICAUTHORITY: EXTERNALITY & BAD INFINITY
In his discussion of efforts on the part of the governmental bureaucracy [Polizei] to solve
the problem of poverty, Hegel focusses on two broad strategies: direct intervention in the
domestic economy and the development of foreign markets. Hegel saw both strategies destined
to fail, and the reasons he had for thinking this failure inevitable suggest what, for him, a genuine
solution to the problem of modern poverty would have to look like.
The first strategy involves a wide range of programs familiar from the history of
Keynesianism and state socialism: production regulations, price controls, jobs programs,
protectionism, and, more generally, measures aimed at regulating and moderating the vicissitudes
of the marketplace [§§231-249]. Although Hegel was a staunch defender of certain regulatory
practices (and very clearly of the public authority’s responsibility for the infrastructure), he
argues that the public authority’s way of overcoming the blindness and extreme particularity of
civil society is "external" to the will of participants in the market [§231, 236]. Individuals
experience the public authority the way people often seem to experience taxation and regulation:
as a bureaucracy whose purpose and policies are not understood or recognized as an expression
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of their will, even if they sometimes benefit from them. In part, this experience may disappear as
members of civil society become reconciled with their society as a result of coming to
understand that it is rational to have differentiated economic and political roles.xiii But it is also
clear that Hegel is thinking of a set of public agencies that, by their nature, must operate on the
basis of elite expertise and will thus always be somewhat alien to ordinary members of society.
On this reading, Hegel is arguing that bureaucratic institutions are necessarily ineffective in
combating poverty because of their essential externality. Given the motivational problems
involved, a command economy is not the best strategy for fighting poverty.xiv What this shows,
in terms of the logic of Hegel’s overall argument, is that poverty cannot be eliminated through
external interventions, that is, by having the universal imposed. Hence the need, as we shall see,
for the intermediate and more internal institution of the Korporation.
The second strategy is to find new markets, especially by encouraging international trade
and colonization [§§246-8]. As a structural solution, this approach is initially more promising,
for it is aimed at increasing society’s "general resources" by addressing what Hegel sees as the
fundamental problem, namely, a lack of consumers: "The poverty of workers consists precisely
in the fact that there are no takers for what they produce. There is too much capital present, and
so more is produced than the nation can consume." [VPR 19: 199]. Like Marx, Hegel saw the
development of the forces of production as in the driver's seat: in civil society, productivity
"....increases in an unendingly large proportion to consumer need, and thus in the end even those
who work hard cannot earn their bread." [VPR IV: 612]. The only way out seems to be to find
consumers in less-industrialized countries:
This inner dialectic of society drives it -- or in the first instance this specific
societyxv -- to go beyond its own confines and look for consumers, and hence the
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means it requires for subsistence, in other nations which lack those means of
which it has a surplus or which generally lag behind it in creativity, etc. [§246]
As Hegel emphasizes, the asymmetry is crucial. Colonies and other less-industrialized countries
function as new markets only insofar as they are not able to produce the goods of which the
mother country has a surplus. With regard to the American colonies, for example, Hegel thought
that because American independence left the asymmetry of industrial development intact, it
actually was all to the advantage of Britain.xvi Colonization is thus not a generalizable solution to
the problem of poverty, and it is clear, despite commentators’ claims to the contrary, that Hegel
realized this.xvii
Hegel goes on to argue that international trade in general will not solve the problem of
overproduction behind modern poverty. This may be surprising, since we can easily imagine
symmetrical trading relations in which equally highly industrialized countries export "excess"
goods and yet still provide consumer niches for the "excess" goods of other countries. And there
is even some evidence that Hegel saw the internationalization of economies as offering some
stability [VPR IV: 507f.]. Ultimately, however, the thought that this only postponed the crisis.
Given that civil society is oriented towards limitless expansion, even a successful scenario, in
which new markets are found, provides only the illusion of a solution: a country finds an export
market for surplus products; this enables economic growth, which again leads to overproduction,
and a new border must be crossed in order to secure a new market. And this matter of endlessly
"going beyond oneself" [Übersichhinausgehen] is precisely the sort of fallacious thinking that
Hegel condemns as "bad infinity." The discussion of bad infinity in the Enzyklopädie contains a
description of "flight" that perfectly describes the futile attempt to export the problem of
overproduction:
Anderson, “Hegel's Solution to Poverty” 12
A limit is set, then surpassed, then yet another limit, and so on forever. We have
here nothing but a superficial alternation that remains stuck in the finite. When
one thinks one can free oneself from the finite by stepping into that infinity, then
that is in fact merely the liberation of flight. But the one who flees is still not free,
for in fleeing he is still determined by that from which he is fleeing. [Werke 8:
§94A].xviii
Similarly, attempts to solve the problem of poverty by boosting growth through trade ultimately
remain trapped within the pointless pursuit of infinite expansion. The problem keeps returning.
Thus, despite the undeniable importance of the public authority in many regards, neither
expert regulation of the economy nor growth in foreign markets can ensure that the general
resources of a society will be adequate to prevent poverty. Within the logic of Hegel's account,
the failure of the public authority is the failure of economic policy that lacks the internality and
self-restraint essential to full ethical self-consciousness. And this is precisely what the
Korporation provides.
Before turning to the role of the Korporation, it is worth taking stock of the plausibility
of Hegel’s views on the economy. It must be acknowledged that Hegel’s talk of
"overproduction", as a feature of an entire domestic economy, is at best misleading. For, as long
as money is included as a commodity (which it is), overproduction as such is impossible. As
Say’s Law states, "Goods constitute the demand for goods."xix If I make more shovels than
anyone in my community wants, the price drops and suddenly shovels are a lot more affordable,
so that more people will then buy them. The problem is thus not overproduction per se but rather
the depression of prices in a given market and the resulting fact that I do not earn enough to live
on. But that simply means that I should make something other than shovels – because otherwise,
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I’m just making something that no one really wants (unless the price drops close to zero). Price,
after all, is a mechanism for determining what people think ought to be produced.
Of course, the disruption in my life is serious, and that is really where the suffering comes
in. In line with this, it seems safe to say that Hegel’s strongest point comes from saying that
rapid fluctuations in supply and demand generate unacceptably high costs for those who are
displaced by the fluctuations in employment.
4. THE KORPORATIONAND THE GEBILDETE CONSUMER
Although its precise nature is much-disputed, the Korporation can be thought of as an
intermediate institution or association that provides a form of community between that of the
family and that of the nation. In Hegel’s discussion, membership in a Korporation is a typically
function of one’s participation in a branch of industry – though not of one’s class – but the
activities of the Korporation include political and social activities alongside the economic ones.
Several historical models are available, including the medieval guilds, the Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands in the early 1900s, or the Dutch confessional zuilen ["pillars"] of the century
preceding the Second World War.xx As these models suggest, the Korporation is supposed to
provide a context for everyday cooperation and discursive interaction that generate a feeling of
belonging as well as a heightened understanding of the rationality of one’s social world.
Because of this more "internal" relation between the Korporation and its members, Hegel
views the Korporation as better able to address the needs of the poor. This has often been
noted,xxi but the focus is usually on the way in which this more internal relation provides a
respectful and supportive context for solidary aid: "Within the corporation, the help which
poverty receives loses its contingent and unjustly humiliating character" [§253R; cf. VPR19:
203, 206; VPR III: 709]. This is merely a matter of ameliorating poverty, however. If the
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Korporation is going to play a role in actually addressing the causes of poverty, there has to be
more going on here. And there is.
The moment of the Korporation marks the return of the ethical to civil society, for, as
members of a Korporation, individuals have a heightened consciousness of shared goals and
mutual interdependence:
The Korporation initially has the same function, the same purpose as the public
authority, namely, the particular interest – not, however, as the object of a merely
external ordering activity (as is the case with the public authority), but rather as
the object of an activity that wills the universal, but in such a way that the
individual himself participates in this activity.[VPR IV: 621; see also §255A].
In addition to the oft-noted transformation of ethical disposition this involves, this shift to more
reflective participation of individuals in determining their conditions of life has significant
politico-economic implications as well. And this is the crucial point. For the emergence of this
new awareness raises the possibility of increased rationality of the economy by introducing
attitudes toward of production and consumption in which individuals participate with greater
understanding of how they are contributing to the common good [das Allgemeine].xxii
One way in which this happens is by the Korporation restricting the number of people
who can enter its ranks and thus be productive in a particular industry. The basic idea here is
that, in consciously limiting the number of people producing certain goods or services, the
Korporation prevents wild fluctuations both in employment and production. Thus, when Hegel
asserts that "the corporation has the right...to admit members...in numbers determined by the
universal context" [§252], he is assigning the Korporation the task of assessing, within the
framework of the economy as whole, how many people the industry can sustain. Stephen
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Houlgate formulates Hegel's point here as follows:
[A] corporation can not only limit the number of people producing a certain type
of product within society as a whole, but can also ensure that within the
corporation production opportunities are equitably distributed and that
manufacturers and traders do not try to undercut one another. In this way, the
measures needed to prevent overproduction are taken by the producers
themselves, rather than by the state. This ensures not only that decisions about
production are taken by people who understand it, but also that controls on the
productive activity of members of civil society are self-imposed.xxiii
Here it becomes clear in what sense the Korporation is able to accomplish what the public
authority failed to do. By intervening in the economy "internally" and with an awareness of their
place in the networks of production and consumption, members of Korporationen are better able
to avoid impoverishment that results from producing more than the market can bear at decent
prices. And they can do so, according to Hegel, without violating the principle that individuals
have a right to choose an occupation that makes good use of their talents.xxiv
There are limits to this approach, however, for simply limiting the number of employees
in an occupation is not enough to restrict the uncontrolled expansion of production, particularly
since Hegel traced the tendency toward overproduction not only to periodic swells of hiring, but
also -- even especially -- to efficiency measures and mechanization [VPR IV: 612; VPR17: 138].
More important for my purposes, it does not guarantee sustained consumer demand.
Again, as we have seen repeatedly, we come back to the issue of ensuring stable and
adequate consumer demand so that the collective Vermögen remains high, thus guaranteeing
enough jobs that pay a living wage. And here too the Korporation can play a role, in this case,
Anderson, “Hegel's Solution to Poverty” 16
by providing the context for the formation of more responsible consumer practices. Although
this has not, to my knowledge, been discussed in the literature, I believe that Hegel thought that,
as members of Korporationen, individual consumers can promote the common good -- they "will
the universal" -- by spending their money in ways that increase the general resources
[allgemeine Vermögen], thereby alleviating poverty.
There are several places where Hegel suggests this. To begin with, he emphasizes the
economic importance and rationality of certain modes of consumption. "We can distinguish here
between consumption that also contributes to the general resources and consumption that reduces
the general resources." [VPR III: 618]. Or again:"A big spender benefits civil society more than
someone who contributes the same amount to charity, because the first way is tied to the activity
of others, the employment of their understanding." [VPR III: 615]. Especially in light of his
criticism of conspicuous consumption, it becomes clear that Hegel has in mind an ethic of
responsible consumption, one which involves the form of self-consciousness that, as we saw at
the end of the previous section, is needed for moving beyond the limitations of the public
authority. Among "ungebildeten Völkern," [uncultured peoples] he emphasizes, "there is a lack
of consciousness of the way the use of my property is disadvantageous for others."[VPR IV: 591;
see also the especially strong language at VPR IV: 475-7]. By contrast, the model of the rich
doing good by consuming more is an example of a more general, responsible attitude toward
consumption: responsible consumers understand their consumption as contributing to economic
welfare and – to extend Hegel’s thought here – in times of overconsumption and capital-shortage,
these responsible consumers would presumably spend less and save more. The general principle,
however, is that a society with stable employment patterns will be a society in which consumers
put their money where the jobs are.
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Hegel does not offer many examples, but contemporary experiences with heightened
consumer consciousness shed some light on the possibilities. We are most familiar with
consumer groups that are motivated by moral objections to brutal political regimes (divestiture
from South Africa in the 1980s), inhumane labor practices (child labor in the handmade carpet
industry), environmental degradation (tropical hardwoods), cruelty to animals (especially veal or
frois gras), moral turpitude (movie studios that produce pornographic films), and so on. The
model I see suggested in Hegel is different, however, for it focusses not on a moralization of
consumer practices but rather a concern with the universal in a more purely economic mode. The
point is that consumer preferences themselves would have to be mediated by an understanding of
what current production patterns are and how one’s consumer practices affect them. For
example, if I am aware that a favorite restaurant is having trouble attracting business, I may
frequent it more often to help keep it afloat. If a craze for this Christmas season’s "hot" toy is
leading to wild retail and production fluctuations, I may choose a different gift for a child. Or I
may purchase goods that are produced by laborers earning a living wage, so as to resist the
downward pressures on wages that come from uncertainty and fierce competition. In small
ways, these choices help to support rational and stable growth in consumer demand, and insofar
as this occurs, the general resources are increased.
There is a danger here of what could be called a "productionist" bias. This involves
assuming current production patterns as given, and then requiring individual’s tastes to adapt to
the production. This is not only psychologically implausible, it is clearly much too one-sided for
Hegel. A much more Hegelian picture is to say that both the productionist model and the
economic liberal’s model (according to which production patterns ought to adapt immediately
and constantly to changes in consumer preferences) are each only half right. Though there is no
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point in producing something no one wants, there is also no point in disposing of the
accumulated knowledge of established production patterns – and generating unemployment,
displacement, and poverty in the process – for the sake of consumers’ whims. For example, in a
society in which many people are employed in building wooden houses and are highly skilled at
it, it might make sense – as part of "willing the universal" – for consumers not to give in to a new
fashion for brick houses. To dismiss the relevance of the existing production practices (as
economists tend to do in treating these as irrational attachments to "sunk costs")xxv and to insist
that production must always do the bidding of given preference is to succumb to a form of one-
sided thinking.
Whatever the details of how this ought to be done, it is clear that this attitude of what we
could call the "responsible consumer" perfectly fits Hegel’s model of the advance in rationality
that he terms "self-consciousness", an advance that can only result from the transformative
learning process he calls "Bildung." The concept of Bildung is crucial for understanding why
self-conscious consumer practices are part of the development of civil society, and not a simple
forfeiture of gains of subjective freedom. In the opening sections of "Civil Society," Hegel
describes civil society as a process by which particularity is "educated" to and brought in line
with universality through economic activity.
[In civil society], the individual is initially for himself; he is his own end; yet the
satisfaction of his needs also involves others; in this way, the individual is
dependent on the others, and must be oriented toward them; he must often
sacrifice his particular will, for what matters is [not only] his own will but of
bringing himself in accordance with others who are likewise situated [selbstische
Anderen]. That is, he must distance himself from the particular. In civil society,
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the process [of education] is this erradication of the particular....[T]he uneducated
[ungebildeteI] man always reveals his particularity – now injuring, now offending.
To behave in a universal manner entails having consideration for what is
appropriate to the nature of the relations. [VPR IV: 484; cf. §187,R,A; VPR III:
581-5]
But to say that, in civil society, the particular is educated to will the universal is not to say that
individuals are swallowed up into a general will at the expense of their individuality, originality,
and particularity. Especially with regard to matters that are of relatively little importance to
society and the state, the "formal freedom" of caprice and personal projects has its place [§289R].
What this formative process does put an end to, however, is individuals' insensitivity to the
welfare of others and to the common good, as well providing an understanding of how to avoid
the bad infinity of the "indeterminate multiplication of needs, means, and pleasures" [§195].xxvi
Central to Hegel's account, then, is the idea that education produces an awareness of the impact
of one's actions – including economic activities – on others. This consciousness of one's situation
within webs of interdependence and the sense of responsibility that comes with it emerge only in
a formative process. And the development within civil society that we have followed -- whereby
the interdependence demanded by the market leads through a crisis of poverty and
overproduction to the conscious willing of the universal (first by the public authority and then by
members of Korporationen) – represents just such a developmental process [Bildungsprozeß].
For Hegel, the Korporation is the appropriate institution for this transformation of
consumption practices for several reasons. In part the Korporation can play the role it does
because of the community context it provides. Once an individual is assured recognition within
the Korporation, the economically destabilizing need to prove himself through conspicuous
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consumption vanishes,xxvii and he must instead show his worth "through the manner in which he
uses his wealth for his cooperative [Genossenschaft]" [VPR 19: 207]. How one spends one's
money thus becomes an ethical matter. In this sense, the Korporation represents the "return of
the ethical to civil society" [§249]. More generally, however, the Korporation provides the
context for ongoing, intersubjectively mediated socialization of individuals as responsible agents,
in particular the conscious attention on the part of individuals themselves to the networks of
interdependence within which they move. Within the ethical framework of the Korporation, the
distinction between the sort of consumption that contributes to the common welfare and the sort
that does not becomes the basis for a principle that members of the Korporation can use in
guiding their own lives and in according recognition to others. What we have here, then, is a
subjective appropriation of the logic of "Vermögen" ["resources"] and, thus, an "internalization"
of the coordinating function that the public authority tried to achieve externally. It is the
Korporation that makes this possible, for it is only with the emergence of that form of
community that individuals in civil society become able to relate to their own needs and desires
in a way that is mediated by shared concerns. None of this needs to involve explicit, moral
deliberation about what the right thing to do is. As an instance of the ethical substantiality that
constitutes ethical life, it would come to be second nature or habitual [cf. §151, 151A] that
responsible consumers consider the impact of their practices. And that second nature is acquired
and sustained through the socializing context of the Korporation.
The notion of the gebildete, responsible consumer I have been describing can be clarified
with a parallel in contemporary discussions of the role of political associations and the public
sphere within a model of deliberative democracy.xxviii In the context of political will-formation,
the role of intermediate institutions is to offer a context in which arbitrary, subjective political
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opinions of individuals are educated or "gebildet" in a way that allows for both stability and
flexibility. The rationality afforded by a reflexive moment of public deliberation provides
protection against both the wild political vacillations of plebiscitary democracy (the political
corollary of laissez-faire economics) and the rigidity of expert-driven democracy (the political
corollary of a command economy run by the public authority). This is not something that
happens by itself. It requires a public context. And thus we can imagine the Korporation
playing a parallel role in shaping responsible practices of consumption.
One difficulty for the interpretation I have been offering is that, while the control of
production naturally falls to the Korporation given that its membership is based on shared
connection to a specific branch of industry, the same cannot be said for consumption.xxix One
response is to say even if we assume that corporate membership must be industry-based or
profession-based, the Korporationen serve as general schools of virtue, inculcating practices of
consumption that are good for the whole economy, rather than only for one’s own Korporation.
On this model, the Korporationen function to instill a sense of economic citizenship and civility,
just as they do for the political realm. Alternatively, the Korporationen can be understood more
broadly, as including social and cultural associations, something suggested by Hegel’s discussion
of churches [§270R]. This would then allow for membership in multiple Korporationen: one is a
Catholic and a lawyer and a member of a coop for buying organic food and a user of Apple
computers – each of which offers an institutional context of ethical socialization [Bildung], but in
a way that is geared toward protecting specific interests that one shares with the interests of one’s
Korporation. Either way, we can certainly envision associations that serve to develop, inculcate,
and reenforce patterns of action – in this case, of consumption – that have the potential to help
stabilize the economy.
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5. CONCLUSION
Whether a transformation in practices of consumption could actually be realized and
whether it would end poverty is a very open question.xxx My claim here, however, is that Hegel
had more of a sense than is usually thought of what the components of a solution to poverty
would have to be. His published texts are clearly pessimistic about the prospects for such a
solution, but particularly in the lectures that he gave toward the end of his life, he seemed to hold
out a vision of a world in which poverty would no longer do that damage that he saw it doing in
England.
Even as a proposed reading of Hegel, however, there are several issues yet to be resolved.
First, more would need to be said about the model of the responsible consumer, its psychological
feasibility, its compatibility with the decentralized, complex conditions of market economics, and
its relation to the form of ethical freedom that Hegel calls "autonomy". Second and relatedly,
more would need to be said about the character of the Korporation in which this responsible
consumer would be found and formed, particularly regarding the discursive and deliberative
character of this form of associational life. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the residual
particularity of the Korporation needs to be addressed.xxxi Hegel saw the Korporation as in
danger of becoming mired in the myopic defense of its own interests and as thus in need of
integration into more universal moment of ethical life, namely, what Hegel calls the "state"
[§289A]. The key, then, is to show that the logic of Hegel’s argument demands a model
according to which the Korporation internalizes some of the self-consciousness and universality
of the moment of the state without returning to the external controlling mechanisms of the
Polizei or exclusively top-down control by the state.xxxii
However much may still remain unclear at this point about the details, what I hope to
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have made plausible is that, on Hegel’s view, any solution to the problem of poverty would have
to pay attention to practices of consumption and that one of the potentials for increased
rationality afforded by the Korporation is for the formation of more self-conscious, sittlichen,
and responsible consumers.xxxiii
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